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"IF I HAD A HAMMER": DEFENDING SLAPP
SUITS IN TEXAS
Chad Barucht
The court perceives this [lawsuit], with a great deal of alarm, as part of a
growing trend of what have come to be known as "SLAPP suits." . . . The
filing of such suits has seen increasing use over the past decade.... [T]he
wholly lawful exercise, by citizens in a community, of the right to petition their
local government to follow a certain course of action ...should be vigorously
protected and should not expose
1 individuals to suit by persons unhappy with
the results of such petitioning.
Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First Amendment expression
can scarcely be imagined.2

INTRODUCTION

There is a new trend in American litigation that is being used with
increasing frequency against politically active citizens.3 "Americans
by the thousands are being sued, simply for exercising one of our most
cherished constitutional rights-'speaking out' on political issues."4
This "pernicious and unacceptable threat" to American liberty is part
of a growing nationwide phenomenon.5 These lawsuits, aimed at stit B.A., J.D., University of Minnesota. Chad Baruch is a partner in the Dallas
and Minneapolis law firm of Abbott & Baruch. He is the former Vice-President for
Legal Affairs of the ACLU's Dallas chapter, and Adjunct Professor of Government at
Brookhaven College.
1. Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 524-26 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
2. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1992), affd, 616 N.Y.S.2d
98 (App. Div. 1994).
3. See George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation" ("SLAPPS"): An Introduction for Bench, Bar, and Bystanders, 12
BRIDGE.

L.

REV.

937, 938 (1992).

4. GEORGE S. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, "SLAPPs" - "Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation"in Government - Diagnosis and Treatment of the New-

est Civil Rights Abuse, 9 CIVIL RIGIrTs LITIGATION & ATTORNEY'S
HANDBOOK 359, 359-60 (Clark et al. eds., 1993).

FEE ANNOTATED

The targets of these SLAPPs are generally not extremists, radicals, or even
professional activists, but instead typical, middle class, middle-of-the-road
Americans. Overwhelmingly, targets are individuals, rather than organizations. Of the individuals sued, 'concerned citizens' constitute the largest category, but significant numbers.were representing organizations, acting on
their own vested economic/property interests, or on family matters.
George W. Pring & Penelope A. Canan, SLAAPs: An Overview of the Practice,C935
ALI-ABA 1, 11 (1994) [hereinafter SLAPP Overview].
5. Ralph Michael Stein, SLAPP Suits: A Slap at the First Amendment, 7 PACE
ENVTL.

L. REV. 45, 45 (1989). SLAPPs are found in every jurisdiction and virtually

all cases have arisen after 1970. See Pring & Canan, supra note 3, at 940.
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fling political expression, have come to be known as "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation," or "SLAPPs." 6
SLAPPs are generally an attempt by one party to transform a public
issue into a private legal dispute, thereby shifting both forum and issue to the disadvantage of the politically active citizen.7 This tactic is
effective, as the United States Supreme Court has noted:
A lawsuit may no doubt be used ... as a powerful instrument of
coercion or retaliation .... Regardless of how unmeritorious the...
suit is, the [defendant] will most likely have to retain counsel and
incur substantial legal expenses to defend against it ....Furthermore ... the chilling effect ... upon [a target's] willingness to engage in protected activity is multiplied 8where the complaint seeks
damages in addition to injunctive relief.
The cost to SLAPP targets is significant, and may include attorney's
fees, court costs, emotional trauma, lost wages, political credit
problems, and insurance cancellations. 9 The societal costs are also
immense:
[W]e shudder to think of the chill.., were we to allow this lawsuit
to proceed. The cost to society in terms of the threat to our liberty
and freedom is beyond calculation.... To prohibit robust debate on
these questions would deprive society of the benefit of its collective
thinking and .. .destroy the free exchange of ideas which is the
adhesive of our democracy.' °
This article discusses various approaches to defending SLAPPs in
Texas, including defenses available under both federal and state law,
and then urges that further action be taken to undermine the effectiveness of SLAPPing in Texas.
I.

EARLY DIAGNOSIS OF THE

SLAPP

Without question, the most important step in combatting a SLAPP
is early diagnosis - in other words, determining that the claim is in
fact a SLAPP. The goal of the SLAPP- to curtail political expression
6. "The term was coined by George W. Pring and Penelope Canan of the Univer-

sity of Denver to describe what they call a 'new breed of lawsuits stalking America."'
Alexandra Dylan Lowe, The Price of Speaking Out, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 48.
7. See id. at 50. The true goal of a SLAPP is to silence political speech by threatening to file or by filing retaliatory litigation. See David J. Abell, Comment, Exercise
of Constitutional Privileges: Deterring Abuse of the First Amendment - "Strategic
Lawsuits Against PoliticalParticipation,"47 SMU L. REV. 95, 96 (1993).
8. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740-41 (1983) (citation
omitted) (discussing SLAPP suits in the context of employer-employee relations).
9. See Sharlene A. McEvoy, "The Big Chill": Business Use of the Tort of Defamation to Discourage the Exercise of First Amendment Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 503, 505 (1990); Pring & Canan, supra note 3, at 942.
10. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 43 (W. Va. 1981).
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through harassment and intimidation" - makes this .need for early
diagnosis especially important. Most SLAPPs are ultimately unsuccessful, and are eventually dismissed.'
However, a SLAPP is successful where it deters political expression, regardless of the actual
legal outcome of the lawsuit. 3 Thus, a lengthy and expensive legal
victory by the SLAPP target is no victory at all. The target has paid
dearly for exercising the right to political expression, and other potential political actors shall no doubt take note of the costs attached to
political participation.' 4 Consequently, an attorney defending a
SLAPP must act early to gain dismissal of the lawsuit. A predicate to
early action is early diagnosis.
The first step in diagnosing a SLAPP is setting aside traditional notions concerning the lawsuit's subject matter. Rather than viewing the
lawsuit in relation to its stated claims, such as libel, defamation, or
interference with contract, the defending attorney must recognize and
convey to the court quickly that the lawsuit is a SLAPP,15 and it impli11. See Joseph J. Brecher, The Public Interest and Intimidation Suits: A New Approach, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV.105 (1988); Stacy Goetz, Note, SLAPP Suits: A
Problem for Public Interest Advocates and Connecticut Courts, 12 BRIDGE. L. REV.
1005 (1992).
12. The University of Denver study found targets eventually "win" more than
77% of SLAPPs, with most other cases settled. Unfortunately, the average duration
of these cases was 36 months. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 4, at 381 n.21. Thus,
"While many of these actions fail at the earliest stages of the civil process, they have
the effect of chilling public participation." McEvoy, supra note 9, at 503.
13. See Pring & Canan, supra note 3, at 944. As commentators have noted:
SLAPP's actually impede solution of the public problem, by removing
parties from the public decisionmaking forum where the cause of the dispute
can be resolved and by invoking a judicial forum where only the effects of
the dispute can be adjudicated. A judge in a defamation case cannot order a
zoning change.
Id. at 943. Further, the underlying political issue is often moot by the time the
SLAPP is dismissed. See "Political Intimidation Suits: SLAPP Defendant Slaps
Back," 4 CIVIL TRIAL MANUAL (BNA) 459, 459 (Oct. 19, 1988).
14. See Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct. 1992), affd 616
N.Y.S.2d 98 (App. Div. 1994).
15. Based on studies performed by Pring and Canan, SLAPP warning signs
include:
1. Local issues (which cause SLAPPs more frequently than grander-scale
state or national issues);
2. Bi-polarity (sharply two-sided, go/no-go, win-lose positioning of parties);
3. Public-private dichotomy (one side viewing the issues from a publicgood, ideological, or value perspective, while the other side views the issues
as private, property rights, personal financial gain, etc.);
4. Non-Goliaths (contrary to expectation, ffiers are more often small, local
entitities and individuals, rather than large operators);
5. Legitimizing-delegitimizing labels (potential filers typically delegitimize
their opponents by labeling them as "ignorant," "self-interested," "little old
persons in tennis shoes," "opportunists," etc., while they legitimize themselves as "professional," "free-enterprise," "having rights," "protecting
property," etc.);
6. Forum bias (SLAPPs are typically filed by "losers," by those who mistrust their ability to win in the public, political forum in which the dispute
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cates societal, not merely individual, issues. "[T]oo often, attorneys
become so involved with defending the 'convenience heading' of the
[SLAPP] that they miss the underlying political issue."'1 6 As a practical matter, most SLAPPS have common threads; including the inclusion of activists as targets, requests for absurdly large damages, and
the inclusion of "John Does" as additional defendants.' 7 To be defined as a SLAPP, a claim generally must be:
1. A civil complaint or counterclaim,
2. Filed against nongovernment individuals or organizations,
3. Alleging injuries from their communications to influence government actions (communications to government officials, government bodies, or the electorate when it is voting on new laws through
the initiative or referendum process),
4. On a substantive issue of some public interest or concern.' 8
Among the most common SLAPP claims are defamation, including
slander and libel, interference with contract, abuse of process, and
conspiracy. 19 In short, the party asserting the SLAPP claim ostensibly
attempts to attach legal consequences to the wholly lawful exercise of
the petition and speech guarantees.
Once the SLAPP is diagnosed, the next step is obtaining early and
favorable resolution. Often, the party initiating the SLAPP may offer
voluntary dismissal in exchange for a halt in the target's political activity, waiver of any countersuit, and a confidentiality agreement. 20 This
is a settlement that achieves all the goals of the SLAPP! A far better
approach for the target is a motion for dismissal or an early motion for
summary judgment,2 ' generally on First Amendment grounds.
starts -be it a zoning board, consumer agency, school board, police conduct
review body, or law-reform lawsuit; ironically, it is when citizens are being

most successful in the political forum that they are most frequently
SLAPPed out of it and into court).
Pring & Canan, supra note 3, at 948-49.
16. Political Intimidation Suits: SLAPP Defendent Slaps Back, in CIVIL TRIAL
MANUAL (BNA) 459, 461 (Oct. 19, 1988). In fact, "SLAPPs come 'camouflaged' as

ordinary civil lawsuits, which contributes to many parties', attorneys', and judges' inability to recognize them and handle them appropriately." Pring & Canan, supra note
3, at 947.
17. See Pring & Canan, supra note 3, at 950.
18. PRING & CANAN, supra note 4, at 364.
19. See id. Further, SLAPPs target certain classes of public issues:
1. Real estate development and zoning;
2. Criticism of public officials and employees;
3. Environmental protection and animal rights;
4. Civil rights (race, gender, employment, and other forms of
discrimination);
5. Neighborhood problems (frequently characterized as the "Not In My
Back Yard" or "NIMBY" syndrome); and
6. Consumer issues.

Pring & Canan, supra note 3, at 947.
20. See id. at 951.
21. See id. at 950.
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II.

LEGAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST

A.

SLAPPs

The Petition Clause

"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."22 In remarkably few words, the First Amendment encapsulates "the most seminal
23
rights of a free people to assemble and to petition the government.
The Petition Clause, other constitutional guarantees, 24 and the entire
American political ethos encourage, promote, and purport to protect
citizens who 25testify, debate, lobby, write, petition, and appeal to their
government.
The right to petition for redress of grievances is "among the most
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. ' 26 It shares
the preferred place accorded in our system of government to the First
Amendment freedoms and has "a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. ' 27 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the right to petition is logically implicit in and fundamental to
the very notion of a republican form of government.2 8
The basis for constitutional protection of speech under the Petition
Clause finds its genesis in what has come to be known as the "NoerrPennington doctrine. '29 The doctrine is based upon the Supreme
Court's decisions in Eastern Rail Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,30 and United Mine Workers v. Pennington.31 Noerr
involved a dispute between railroads and trucking companies for control of freight hauling business. 32 The railroads launched an advertising and lobbying campaign, and the truckers sued alleging antitrust
violations. 33 The Supreme Court held that attempts to solicit government action could not give rise to antitrust liability. 34 The Court
stated, "In a representative democracy such as this, these branches of
22. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The right has ancient roots; it first appeared in English
law more than 1,000 years ago, and by the 17th Century was a fixture there. See
SLAPP Overview, supra note 4, at 6.
23. Stein, supra note 5, at 46.
24. State constitutional petition clauses, public participation laws, open meeting
statutes, citizen-suit statutes, open records acts, and federal and state civil rights acts
protect and promote citizen participation in government. See Pring & Canan, supra
note 3, at 945 n.20.
25. See id. at 945.
26. United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967).
27. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
28. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
29. Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 74 F. Supp. 523, 525 (N.D. IlM. 1990).
30. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
31. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
32. See 365 U.S. at 129.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 139-40.
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government act on behalf of the people and, to a very large extent, the
whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representatives." 35
The Supreme Court decided Pennington five years later. In Pennington, a union successfully petitioned the federal government for an
increase in the minimum wage paid to miners and thus forced smaller
coal companies out of business.36 The Pennington court held that
"[joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust
laws even though intended to eliminate competition."37
As it has developed, "the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine creates an immunity from suit which allows citizens and companies to petition public officials to take certain actions or enact certain provisions." 38 Its
application has extended beyond antitrust to protect citizen communications in a wide variety of cases.39 "The clear import of the NoerrPennington doctrine is to immunize from legal action persons who attempt to induce the passage or enforcement of law or to solicit governmental action even though the result of such activities may
indirectly cause injury to others."4
The Supreme Court recently extended the protections previously
afforded by the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine. 4 ' In City of Columbia v.
35. Id. at 137.
36. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
37. Id.
38. Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 74 F. Supp. 523, 526 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
39. See id. See also Reichenberger v. Pritchard, 660 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that defendants' participation in three municipal administrative proceedings,
where they attempted to eliminate nude dancing in defendants' nightclubs, was safeguarded by the First Amendment right to petition and thus, absolutely privileged);
Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (ruling that First
Amendment's guarantee of the right to petition the government protected private
landowners and their attorney who sought alleged unconstitutional amendment to
zoning ordinance to prevent the plaintiff from building a high-rise apartment complex
to house elderly and handicapped persons); Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Assoc., 467 F.
Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (deciding that a civic association's appearance at official
town meetings and association members' assembly in large numbers at public meetings for the purpose of voicing their opposition to the defendants' zoning application
to establish Hasidic Jewish housing development fell within the First Amendment's
protections, as the activity constituted nothing more than a peaceable assembly petitioning the municipal authorities for redress of grievances); Aknin v. Phillips, 404 F.
Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.) (holding that citizens who petitioned officials to
enforce fire safety regulations and to close down a local discotheque could not be
sued because allowing such a lawsuit would have an unjust chilling effect on the exercise of citizens' First Amendment rights to complain about a public nuisance).
40. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 35 (W. Va. 1981) (ruling that the defendants'
series of communications to the Environmental Protection Agency, the Office of Surface Mining and publication of a newsletter did not defame a coal mining company
but was instead protected by the right to petition the government).
41. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 4, at 368.
Until recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has not been a helpful contributor to
the SLAPP problem .... Instead of seeing the whole SLAPP creature, the

Court dealt with lawsuits against Petition-Clause-protected activity as an
"antitrust" case, a "labor" case, or a "defamation" case. One obvious prob-
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Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,4 the Court considered a classic
SLAPP involving two outdoor advertising companies.43 Newcomer
Omni was attempting to gain a foothold in the Columbia market."4 To
keep Omni out of Columbia, the competing company, Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ("COA") successfully lobbied the city council
to adopt rezoning ordinances that effectively destroyed Omni's ability
to compete.45 Omni sued COA and the city claiming that COA's petitioning of the council was simply a "sham" designed to interfere directly with Omni's business. 4 6 A jury awarded Omni one million
dollars in damages,47 however, the Supreme Court reversed the
award.48
Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion in Omni and dealt with
the Petition Clause/SLAPP issue. 49 The Omni Court dramatically
strengthened protection for SLAPP targets by holding that the Petition Clause shields efforts "to influence public officials regardless of
intent or purpose."5 That the person's motives may be selfish is totally irrelevant. 51 After Omni, the test for protection is clear - as
long as the target's petitioning was aimed at procuring favorable government action, it is protected, and any claim arising from it should be
dismissed without respect to whether the target's motives or purpose
were pure.52 On this, the nine justices were unanimous.53
lem with this approach was that the Court developed inconsistent rules for
each - the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine for antitrust SLAPPs, a second for
labor cases, and the New York Times v. Sullivan test for defamation-based
SLAPPs .... A second, related problem, was that the dismissal test appeared to turn on questions of fact ("sham intent," "actual malice," etc.)
which arguably require a trial and defeat pretrial dismissal; thus, the Court
did the opposite of what it presumably intended - creating a "dismissal
dilemma" or "fact quagmire" that would keep the SLAPP and its chill
alive!"
Id. (citations omitted).
42. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
43. See id. at 367-68.
44. See id. at 368.

45. See id.

46. See id. at 369. The sham exceptions to the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine "applies
when it can be shown that an ostensible campaign to petition the goverment is actually a cover for nothing more than an attempt to harass (i.e. repeated baseless or
repetitive claims)." Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 526 n.10
(N.D. II. 1990). See California Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972). However, "[t]he [Omni] opinion clarifies and strengthens the Noerr-Pennington line of antitrust SLAPP precedents and dramatically curtails the troublesome
California Motor exception which had allowed suits for 'sham' petitioning. Omni
speaks in language applicable to all SLAPPs .... " PRING & CANAN, supra note 4, at
371. Omni narrows the California Motor exception to cases where the governmental
process, not the outcome of the process, is used as a weapon. See id.
47. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 369.

48. See id. at 384.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 379-84.
Id. at 380.
See id.
See id. at 383-84.
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In short, the SLAPP target should argue that dismissal or summary
judgment is warranted because speech aimed at procuring government action is insulated by the Petition Clause. 4 Thus, a SLAPP defendant may request dismissal or summary judgment because:
"[p]laintiff's entire complaint against defendants is based upon nothing more than defendants' exercise of their right, under the first
amendment, to petition the government for a redress of grievances." 55
It is critical that these arguments be presented to the trial court
early and in detail. Judges may otherwise overlook the Petition
Clause argument, relying instead on traditional common-law defenses
to libel, defamation, or interference with contract. But "[i]n dealing
with a First Amendment claim, common-law defenses should be the
last thing they look at."56
B.

The Chilling Effect Doctrine

It is crucial that attorneys representing SLAPP targets focus the attention of the trial judge on the precedential value of SLAPP decisions. Even where SLAPPs fail at the early stages of litigation, they
have the effect of chilling public participation. 7 The Supreme Court
has consistently recognized the need to avoid such a "chilling effect"
on speech. 8
The chilling effect doctrine was borne of the Cold War era. 9 In
response to growing government attempts to infringe on civil liberties,
the Supreme Court made clear that it would protect the full range of
First Amendment activities.60 In an effort to avoid court intervention,
the government began devising schemes to dissuade, rather than prohibit, the exercise of free speech. 61 For example, in Lamont v. Postmaster General,62 the postal service began refusing to deliver mail it
considered to be communist propaganda unless the intended recipient
went through a special requesting process. 63 In Lamont, the Supreme
Court asserted that what the government could not do by prohibition,
53. See id. at 398.
54. See Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 525 (N.D. II1.1990)
(holding landowners' opposition to increased use of public roadway leading to developers' new subdivision and landowners' petitioning town officials to close roadway
was absolutely privileged under the First Amendment).
55. Id.
56. Lowe, supra note 6, at 51.
57. Pring & Canan, supra note 3, at 943.
58. Stein, supra note 5, at 51. See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn, 488
U.S. 347 (1989) (concluding that removal of an elected official had a chilling effect on
the official's and his supporters' exercise of free speech rights).
59. See Stein, supra note 5, at 50.
60. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
61. See Stein, supra note 5, at 50.
62. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
63. See id. at 303.
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it could not accomplish by intimidation.64 The Court recognized that
to put a price, any price, on the exercise of a first amendment right
would be to chill the exercise of such rights and prevent the free flow
of ideas so vital to a democratic society.65
The chilling effect doctrine has been variously stated, "but its bedrock principle has never changed: the protection constitutionally afforded any one person participating in the political process must
protect all, and the recognition that most citizens are unwilling or unable to pay a price, actual or potential, for the exercise of their ' rights
66
must be factored into the formulation of first amendment law.
SLAPP cases beg for application of the chilling effect doctrine.67
Like their Cold War predecessors, community activists are illequipped economically and politically to withstand SLAPP claims.
More often than not, SLAPP targets have lawfully exercised their first
amendment rights, and to permit liability to attach, or even to let
these claims proceed to trial, would undeniably have the effect of chilling not only their future political participation, but the participation
of other citizens as well.
C. State and Federal ConstitutionalPrivilege
In a defamation context, a privileged communication consists of
words, slanderous or libelous in character, that are spoken or written
on an occasion where they are not actionable. 68 The only privileged
communication of this nature specified by Texas statute is newspaper
and periodical articles. 69 Thus, whether ordinary communications are
64. See id. at 305-07.
65. See id.
66. Stein, supra note 5, at 51.

67. The "chilling effect" of such [SLAPP] lawsuits may extend well beyond
the concern immediately at issue. Citizens, who are normally not predisposed to consider the threat of litigation as an inherent cost of participating
in government, find themselves less willing to become involved in public debate and governmental decision making.
Abell, supra note 7, at 112.
68. See W. PAGE KEETON
§ 114, at 815 (5th ed. 1984).

ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

69. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.§ 73.002 (Vernon 1986). Section 73.002
states:
(a) The publication by a newspaper or other periodical of a matter covered
by this section is privileged and is not a ground for a libel action. This privilege does not extend to the republication of a matter if it is proved that the
matter was republished with actual malice after it had ceased to be of public
concern.
(b) This section applies to:
(1) a fair, true, and impartial account of:
(A) a judicial proceeding, unless the court has prohibited publication of
a matter because in its judgment the interests of justice demand that the
matter not be published;
(B) an official proceeding, other than a judicial proceeding, to administer the law;
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privileged is generally determined by reference to judicial decisions.
Broadly speaking, 'a communication ...fairly made by one in dis-

charge of a public or private duty, legal, moral, or social, of perfect or
imperfect obligation, or in conduct of his own affairs, to one who has
corresponding interest or duty to receive such communication... is
privileged."' 7
The United States and Texas Constitutions provide significant protection for speech, 7 1 and statements concerning matters of public concern are generally privileged. 72 Further, notwithstanding the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and press, the Supreme
Court has held that statements on matters of public concern be proveable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law.73
The freedom accorded to speech on public issues under Texas law is
addressed in Yiamouyiannis v. Thompson.74 During a city debate on
whether to switch to a flouridated water supply, the defendant called,
the plaintiff a "quack," an "outrageous hoke artist," an "imported
fearmonger," and implied he lacked solid credentials.75 The Texas
Court of Appeals held that when the topic is a public issue, speakers
may express opinions about their opponents without having to prove
the substantial truth of those statements.76
(C) an executive or legislative proceeding (including a proceeding of a
legislative committee), a proceeding in or before a managing board of an
educational or eleemosynary institution supported from the public revenue,
of the governing body of a city or town, of a county commissioners court,
and of a public school board or a report.of or debate and statements made in
any of those proceedings; or
(D) the proceedings of a public meeting dealing with a public purpose,
including statements and discussion at the meeting or other matters of public
concern occurring at the meeting; and
(2) reasonable and fair comment on or criticism of an official act of a
public official or other matter of public concern published for general
information.
Id.
70. Browning v. Gomez, 332 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (quoting International & G.N.R. Co. v. Edmundson, 222 S.W. 181, 183
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, holding approved)).
71. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8. The Texas Constitution
proclaims, "Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on
any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be
passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
72. See, e.g., Rawlins v. McKee, 327 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("[Ciriticism of the official acts or conduct of public officials...
is privileged and not libelous, unless the charge is of such nature as to be grounds for
removal from office."). Id.
73. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986) ("Here,
we hold that, at least where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements
at issue are false.").
74. 764 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, writ denied).
75. Id. at 339-40.
76. See id. at 341.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol3/iss1/4
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V3.I1.2

10

Baruch: "If I Had a Hammer": Defending Slapp Suits in Texas

1996]

DEFENDING SLAPP SUITS IN TEXAS

Existing alongside First Amendment protections is a common law
fair comment privilege that has in Texas been codified at Section
73.002(b)(2) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.7 7
Although directed to media defendants, the same protection exists at
common law for non-media speakers. 8 This protection applies to
statements that constitute fair or reasonable criticism or comment on
a matter of public concern published for general information.79
D. Defenses to Defamation
The most frequent SLAPP claim is defamation.8 0 Frequently, summary judgment may be available on the basis of common-law defenses
to defamation. 8 ' "Prior to 1901 there was in Texas no statutory definition of civil libel, and actions for recovery of damages for libel were
governed by the common law."8s2 In 1901, the Texas Legislature for
the first time enacted a chapter on civil libel.8 3 Under the current
version of that statute, libel is defined as:
[D]efamation expressed in written or other graphic form that tends
to blacken the memory of the dead or that tends to injure a living
person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's
honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation or to publish the natural defects of anyone and thereby
expose the person to public hatred, ridi4
cule, or financial injury.8
Often, a defamation claim, including a SLAPP claim, is based upon
implication or innuendo. In Texas, however, innuendo or implication
may not be used to extend the meaning and effect of language charged
as slanderous.8 5 "The test is what construction would be placed upon
such language by the average reasonable person... not... the plain77. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.002(b)(2) (Vernon 1986). In addition to state and federal constitutional privilege, "[m]any jurisdictions already provide
protection from some SLAPPs, in the form of 'privilege' or 'immunity' laws. These
judicial common law precedents or statutes grant a privilege or otherwise immunize
and protect communications by citizens in government contexts." Pring & Canan,
supra note 3, at 953.
78. See Rawlins v. McKee, 327 S.W.2d 633, 635-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding privileged and non libelous, under Texas common law,
a published criticism in a political advertisement during a campaign that a candidate
for public office was a "radical ... backed ... by the big shot labor bosses").
79. See id. at 637.
80. See SLAPP Overview, supra note 4, at 12; McEvoy, supra note 9, at 507-19.
81. Defenses to defamation include consent, truth, absolute privilege and qualified
privilege. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS §§ 14-16 (5th ed. 1984).
82. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 160 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Tex. 1942).

83. See id.

84. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986).
85. See Arant v. Jaffe, 436 S.W.2d 169, 176 (Tex. Civ. App.- Dallas 1968, no writ)
(holding innuendo explains, but does not extend, the meaning and effect of language
alleged as libelous).
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tiff."8 6 Likewise, "[a] statement may be false, abusive, unpleasant,
and objectionable .. without being defamatory,"" and the use of an
unpleasant epithet or description is not slander.88 Further, the use of
hyperbole and vigorous epithets are protected as opinion by courts
interpreting the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech
and press. 89 Of course, truth is an absolute defense to libel or
slander. 90
III.

LEGISLATIVE ACTION

As concern about the impact of SLAPPs has grown, several state
legislatures have enacted laws intended to counter their chilling effect.
Anti-SLAPP laws have been enacted in California, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island, and
Washington. 91
While the measures enacted by different states may vary, they do
have common threads. At the center of most of these laws is "a requirement of early court review of the merits of lawsuits characterized
as SLAPPs."92 Some statutes also provide for some form of burdenshifting, forcing the SLAPP plaintiff to prove that the target's speech
is unprotected. 93 Additional protections include an automatic stay of
86. Schauer v. Memorial Care Sys., 856 S.W.2d 437, 448 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1993, no writ).
87. Id. at 446. See Raymer v. Doubleday & Co., 615 F.2d 241, 242-43 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that statements like "John Raymer's round face... resembled a hardboiled egg" are not defamatory as a matter of law).
88. See Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 915 (Wyo. 1992) ("Clearly falling
into this catagory [of non-actionable rhetorical hyperbole]are Hustler [Magazine's]
statements characterizing Dworkin as: "'little guy' 'militant lesbian feminist'....").
89. See, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (determining the word "blackmail" used under the circumstances of the case was not slander);
Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903 (Wyo. 1992) (holding descriptions of the plaintiff
as a "foul-mouthed, abrasive man-hater," "cry-baby," and "shit-squeezing sphincter"
were not defamatory); El Paso Times, Inc. v. Kerr, 706 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (deciding accusation of cheating in this case was the defendant's opinion and thus protected speech).
90. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.005 (Vernon 1986); Randall's
Food Market, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex. 1995).
91. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
10, §§ 8136-38 (Supp. 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West Supp.
1996); MI N. STAT. ANN.§ 554.02 (1996); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 241 to - 21, 246
(1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§§ 41.640-.670 (Michie 1996); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw
§§ 70-a, 76-a (McKinney Supp. 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a), 3212(h) (McKinney
1994 & Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.500-.520 (West Supp. 1996).
92. Lowe, supra note 6, at 52.
93. Attorney Alexandra Dylan Lowe states:
Although the laws differ somewhat from state to state, at the heart of most
anti-SLAPP statutes is a requirement of early court review of the merits of
lawsuits characterized as SLAPPs. Minnesota's statute, for example, protects individuals from liability for 'lawful conduct or speech that is genuinely
aimed ... at procuring government action, unless the conduct or speech
constitutes a tort or a violation of a person's constitutional rights.'
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discovery pending determination of the First Amendment issues and
recovery of attorney's fees by the target. 94
Texas does not as yet have any anti-SLAPP statutes. To be effective, any anti-SLAPP law in Texas should at a minimum accomplish
the following:
(1) Protect all public advocacy and communications to government, whether testimony, letters, or petitions;
(2) Apply to all government agencies and agents, whether federal,
state, regional, or local, and regardless of governmental branch;
(3) Serve as a vivid and clear warning against the filing of
SLAPPs;
(4) Provide for early and effective review of SLAPPs, with the
burden shifting to the SLAPP filer to prove absence of communication privilege;
(5) Provide both a cure for the target and a penalty to the filer,
including early and effective review, coupled with awards of attorney's fees.95
At the same time, care must be taken to draft anti-SLAPP provisions to comport with constitutional requirements. Most importantly,
the legislation should not require the trial judge to make factual determinations that violate the plaintiff's right to a jury trial. At least two
anti-SLAPP statutes have run afoul of the jury trial guarantee. 96 Because the primary issue urged by the target in seeking dismissal shall
be privilege, an issue of law in most cases, it should not be difficult to
draft anti-SLAPP legislation that preserves the right to a jury trial.
As the next section makes clear, Texas citizens, are particularly vulnerable to SLAPPs, and legislative action would do much to alleviate
this vulnerability.
IV. SLAPPBACKS:

THE VULNERABILITY OF TEXANS TO

SLAPPs
In the absence of state laws countering the negative effects of
SLAPPs, the most popular and successful response to such suits has
Similiarly, the New York citizens Participation Act requires a court to
grant a motion to dismiss when public participation is involved unless the
plaintiff can prove that the lawsuit has a "substantial basis in law or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification or reversal

of existing law."
Lowe, supra note 6, at 52.

94. See id.
95. See Abell, supra note 7, at 126-30; John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problems of SLAPPs, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 395, 448-51 (1993);
Lowe, supra note 6, at 52-53.
96. See Opinion of the Justices (SLAPP Suit Procedures), 641 A.2d 1012, 1015
(N.H. 1994); Lowe, supra note 6, at 53 (citing Halley's Custom Homes v. Levine, No.
95-9126 (Hennepin County Dist. Ct., Minn., Sept. 18, 1995)).
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been the "SLAPPBACK."97 A number of SLAPP targets have filed
countersuits alleging injuries from the original SLAPP.98 Several of
these cases have resulted in significant victories for the original
SLAPP targets. 9
Among the most common grounds for SLAPPBACKs are abuse of
process, malicious prosecution, and intentional or negligent infliction
of emotional distress. 100 According to one study, SLAPPBACK wins
outnumber the losses by a two-to-one ratio.' 0 ' Among the more significant awards in SLAPPBACK cases are:
(1) A jury verdict of $86.5 million against owners of an infectiouswaste disposal company
1 who SLAPPed a worker for criticizing their
incinerator operation. 02
(2) An $11.1 million verdict, upheld on appeal, against agribusiness corporations who SLAPPed three family farmers. 0 3
(3) A verdict of more than $9.8 million against one of the nation's
largest hospital chains for SLAPPing one of its physicians for advocating hospital cost-containment
legislation and encouraging others
14
to do the same. 0
These awards may sound particularly encouraging to SLAPP
targets. Unfortunately, none of the SLAPPBACK weapons is likely
to be available to SLAPP targets in Texas.
It is frequently stated that claims for malicious prosecution are not
favored in Texas. 10 5 The elements of a claim for malicious prosecution
are: (1) commencement of a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff
at the defendant's instigation; (2) termination of the proceeding in the
plaintiff's favor; (3) finding of plaintiff's innocence; (4) absence of
probable cause for institution of the proceeding; (5) malice on the part
of the defendant; and (6) damage to the plaintiff that must have0 6resulted in an interference with the plaintiff's person or property.1
97. See Lowe, supra note 6, at 53; Pring & Canan, supra note 3, at 955.
98. See Pring & Canan, supra note 3, at 955-57. See, e.g., Leonardini v. Shell Oil
Co., 264 Cal. Rptr. 883, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) In Leonardini,an attorney for the
California Pipe Trades Council brought a malicious prosecution suit against a manufacturer of polybutylene pipe after the manufacturer filed suit for injunctive and declaratory relief to stop the dissemination of documents alleging the manufacturer's
product contained a carcinogen. See id. at 886-87. The California Court of Appeals
affirmed an award to the plaintiff of $197,000 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. See id at 908.
99. See Pring & Canan, supra note 3, at 955-57.
100. See id. at 954-55; Lowe, supra note 6, at 53.
101. See Pring & Canan, supra note 3, at 955.
102. See SLAPP Overview, supra note 4, at 18 n.85 and accompanying text.
103. See id. at n.84 and accompanying text.
104. See id. at n.86 and accompanying text.
105. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. 1994).
106. See Moiel v. Sandlin, 571 S.W.2d 567, 570-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1978, no writ); Davidson v. First State Bank, 310 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1958, no writ).
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The problem for most SLAPP targets in proving malicious prosecution is three-fold. First, there must be a termination of the proceeding
in the target's favor, and any settlement bars a malicious procecution
claim. 1°7 Thus, to keep open the possibility of a malicious prosecution
claim, the target must commit the resources to defend the SLAPP
through its entire course and risk the outcome of the trial. Second,
the burden of establishing malice is at best difficult. To risk continued
defense of the SLAPP based on the hope of proving malice is almost
certainly an unwise strategy. Finally, the Texas requirement of interference with person or property forecloses the possibility of maintaining a malicious prosecution claim for most SLAPP targets.
Likewise, the abuse of process claim is unlikely to provide any basis
for a SLAPPBACK. Abuse of process is the defendant's illegal, improper, or perverted use of a legal process neither warranted nor authorized by the process.10 8 However, there is no liability where the
defendant merely carried the proceeding to its authorized conclusion,
even with bad intent. 1°9 A groundless suit filed with malice in an attempt to extort a settlement is not sufficient to establish abuse of process. 110 Equally fatal to most SLAPP targets is the requirement that
there be damages to person or property because the SLAPP target's
only damages may be those incurred in defending the lawsuit."' Finally, most SLAPP targets will be unable to maintain a valid claim
for infliction of emotional distress. Texas does not recognize any
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress," 2 and the standard3
for intentional infliction of emotional distress is difficult to meet."1
Again, to risk defense of the SLAPP through trial in the hopes of
prevailing on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
would be terribly risky.
107. See Davidson, 310 S.W.2d at 681.
108. See Detenbeck v. Koester, 886 S.W.2d 477, 480-81 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, no writ); Blanton v. Morgan, 681 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

109. See W.

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE

LAW OF TORTS

§ 121, at 898 (5th ed. 1984).

110. See Detenbeck, 886 S.W.2d at 480.
111. See Martin v. Trevino, 578 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978,

writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Smart v. Carlton, 557 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Morris v. Taylor, 353 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1962,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mosley v. Harkins, 147 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amaillo 1941,

no writ); Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Keeland Bros., 60 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App.Galveston 1933, no writ).

112. See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
113. The elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1)
that the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant's conduct was
extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff emotional
distress; and (4) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress. See Twyman v.
Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 46 (1965)). That acts are tortious is not sufficient to establish extreme and outrageous conduct. See Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994) (citing
RESTATEMENT OF (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
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CONCLUSION

The SLAPP target in Texas faces a daunting prospect. The only real
options for defense of the SLAPP are a motion to dismiss or a motion
for summary judgment based on First Amendment grounds, defense
of the claim through trial, or a one-sided settlement. At least one, and
probably two of these options necessitate significant expenditure of
funds on attorney's fees. Worst of all, even the SLAPP target who
prevails or obtains a favorable settlement has little prospect of recovery for the damages caused by the SLAPP.
At a time when issues related to the environment and public education make citizen involvement crucial, the chilling effect engendered
by SLAPPs must not be tolerated. The Texas Legislature should provide protection for SLAPP targets. The fabric of the First Amendment should not be allowed to fray.
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